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The 2014 International Symposium Co-hosted by 
 Hiroshima University and University of Niigata Prefecture 
 
 “Strengthening International Organizations in a World of 
Turmoil, - The Role of Hiroshima- ” 
 
 This is proceedings of the 39th Hiroshima University Peace Science Symposium 
“Strengthening International Organizations in a World of Turmoil -The Role of Hiroshima-” 
held on November 21st 2014 co-hosted by Hiroshima University and University of Niigata 
Prefecture. The symposium consisted of three sessions. The first session was related to the 
“Achievements of International Organizations after WWⅡ”  and Professor G. John 
Ikenberry from Princeton University, Mari Amano, Former Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary and the Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on 
Disarmament, and Professor Takashi Inoguchi, President of the University of Niigata 
Prefecture, held a lively debate. The second session, “Strengthening International 
Organizations in a World of Turmoil” contained a heated discussion between Professor 
David Held from Durham University, Professor Akiko Yuge from Hosei University and 
Professor Tsuneo Nishida, Director of IPSHU. Later, former UN Under-Secretary-General 
Ambassador Yasushi Akashi gave a keynote speech with the title “Present Challenges of 
Japan and the World”. The third session targeted “Hiroshima’s Contribution”. Mr. Brian 
Finlay, Managing Director of Stimson Center, Professor Kazumi Mizumoto, Vice President 
of Hiroshima Peace Institute at Hiroshima City University, Professor Takehiko Yamamoto, 
Emeritus Professor of Waseda University and Professor Noriyuki Kawano from IPSHU 
deliberated the issues. Reports stated that the voice of Hiroshima is reaching the nations 
of the world. However, questions were raised as to how the voice of the A-bomb victims 
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第Ⅰ部  戦後国際関係に果した国際機関の役割  
 
The Future of Multilateralism: 
Governing the World in a Post-Hegemonic Era 
 
 
G. John Ikenberry 
Professor, Princeton University 
 
Thank you. It is great to be here. I 
want to thank Ambassador Nishida and 
Professor Inoguchi for inviting me. This is my 
fourth trip to Hiroshima, and my first trip was 
several years ago with my wife and son and it 
was a very emotional trip visiting the museum. 
Over the years, I have come to find this to be a 
very special city, and as this conference 
represents, I think it is important for this city 
and for peace, that the Institute for Peace and 
Science, the University as well, continue to find 
a way for the university and the city itself to 
play a role in the global discussion of war and 
peace, nuclear weapons, and the topic today at 
global institutions. 
65–70 years ago, the world began to 
build on the ashes of World War II a global 
governance system, a multilateral system of 
governance. It was built through leadership by 
the United States and its allies in Europe and 
Asia. It was organized around big institutions 
that are still with us today, the Bretton Woods 
Institutions; the GATT which became the 
WTO; the United Nations which of course has 
become ever more important even as we worry 
about its ability to do what its objective says it 
should do; and the G system i.e., the G7, the G8, 
the G20; and of course, the alliance system. 
These are all large institutions that have been 
built over a half-century ago, and are still 
playing some role although again, we all worry 
about the future. 
There are institutions that have been 
built around big ideas. Ideas about 
multilateralism, open trade, what we call 
cooperative security, reciprocity, democratic 
accountability, and leadership by the countries 
that have the most to win and the most to lose 
in the governance of the global system. This 
global system that has been over 60 years old 
is now in a period of crisis. I think the 
Ambassador was hinting that we are now in a 
period of where the forces of disorder seem to 
be greater than the forces of order or the 
breakdown of the governance seems to be 
overtaking the forces of governance. And it 
seems to me that this is really true in various 
ways, and we are really here to debate what we 
can do going forward, but to do that we also 
need to look backward at what we did in the 
last half-century. 
But the great forces, I think, that are 
creating a crisis of global governance are at 
least two. First is the rise of new states and 
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non-western developing states led by China, 
which were not part of the old governance 
system. And second, the rise of new forms of, 
what we call, complex interdependence and the 
rise of economic and security interdependence 
that are creating new demands for the 
governance, but which are very complex issues 
that are not the old issues that we used to build 
cooperation around—the old issues such as 
tariff reductions or small matters of peace 
keeping. Now it is climate change. How do we 
address climate change? Nuclear and weapons 
of mass destruction proliferation, politically 
weak states, and of course, super empowered 
non-state actors, terrorist groups that 
potentially could acquire weapons capabilities 
that could destroy cities and destabilize the 
world. 
So, I think everybody agrees that 
there is a transition in the global system going 
on; and in the background, it is not just a 
transition of rise and decline of the states. So, 
it is a transition of the type of states that are 
going to be influential in the future. The rise of 
the global south of the rising states that were 
previously in the developing world is again led 
by China. Here is a chart that provides some of 
the long-term shifts in the distribution of 
economic capabilities in the world, from the old 
G7 countries, which of course included Japan 
and the United States, to the rise of other 
countries that are an aggregate passing the old 
trilateral countries as the leading states in the 
system. 
Thus, there is a great deal of 
agreement that the power basis of the global 
system are changing. There is less agreement 
on what it means for global rules and 
institutions. But we do have classic arguments 
in the field of international relations about how 
the world deals with these transitions of power. 
And it is not a happy story. The news is not good. 
Certainly from scholars, who we refer to as the 
realist traditions not only provide sweeping 
arguments but also provide troubled stories on 
how the world transitions from one type of 
order to a new type of order. Scholars and 
writers, such as Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, 
E.H. Carr and others, tell us stories of the 
cycles of governance, how in the first instance 
the rising state such as the US after World War 
II builds a global system. It does so because it 
is in its interest to do so: to build structures of 
authority, governance institutions to solve 
problems. But over time, inevitably, powerful 
states decline in relative terms. We do not 
know why that is. 
Why can’t powerful states that are at 
the top of the international system stay there? 
They never have been able to. And so, there is 
an inevitable shift in power and new states are 
rising up. This leads to the next phase of this 
cycle. It is the crisis phase when the power and 
the patrons behind the global system are 
weakened, and the institutions they created 
during their period of strength start to crumble 
and weaken, there might be crises of legitimacy. 
They do not work as well. 
Finally, at the end of the cycle, you 
have new states that rise up and they try to 
assert their views, try to establish alternative 
global order. And either they do it or they don’t. 
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If they do it, you have a different system, let’s 
say, a Chinese centered global governance 
system. Or if they don’t, you have disarray and 
contending great powers that try to assert 
themselves, and you don’t have global 
governance at all. 
There are a lot of people who have 
made these arguments. Here are just covers 
authors who make these stories about 
transitions, they typically have extremely 
attractive book covers, very dramatic with 
dragons, and pictures of one kind or another. 
They are all what I would call profits of grand 
transitions. It raises questions about the future 
if what they have said about the past is true, 
how will the current system cope with these 
rising states and these new types of problems 
of complex interdependence. 
And the questions, of course, are many. 
Faced with these great transitions in the 
system, we want to ask, what would be the 
future of global governance? Will it simply 
move from one type to another? Or is it 
breaking down? Were we looking back 50 years 
from now, look at the period from 1945 to 2014 
or 2008 as the period where we did have global 
governance? But then, we entered a dark era 
where we did not have it. There were no 
countries that were willing to create it. But is 
that true? Or were we simply moving from one 
system to another? 
How tied is multilateral system based 
on openness and rules to American power and 
leadership? What do rising states want? Do 
they want something different? Are they 
willing to invest in multilateral governance or 
are they seeking something else? Are they 
powerful enough to make problems, but not 
powerful enough to solve problems? Or to put 
it, as I have in various occasions, when the 
world becomes less American, will it be less 
liberal? 
The arguments that I make, and I will 
simply just lay them out for a short time that I 
have three arguments. First is that, I am 
optimistic that while there may be a power 
transition, the rising states including China 
are not hostile to a system of open governance, 
rule-based governance. In fact, the demand for 
governance is going up. The problem is the 
supply of the governance i.e., there is certainly 
a demand for more forms of cooperation. How 
we get there, how we, if you will, find bargains, 
coalitions and new authority relations where 
we let new countries have a seat at the table; 
that is the problem, in my view. 
Second, the sources and foundations 
of global governance are not simply a post-
World War II story. For 200 or 250 years in the 
modern era, there has been an ongoing search 
for governance that has been associated with 
the rise of modern societies and a global system. 
And in third, the next -- the crisis of 
global governance today of multilateralism is 
in some sense a crisis of success, rising states, 
new kinds of problems of interdependence. 
That is precisely what you would expect if you 
are building an open system where you give 
countries a chance to trade and invest and grow 
and interact with each other in ever more 
complex ways. In some sense, we are 
experiencing the benefits of globalization as 
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well as the dangers of it, and that requires new 
form of governance, cooperation. 
The term global governance is 
relatively new, but the point I want to make in 
my first argument here is simply that we’ve 
been trying to build global governance for a 
long time, at least 200 years. Ideas about 
governing the world emerged with the 
enlightenment and with the industrial 
revolution. Something called modernity was 
invented in the early 19th century. We were 
witnessing the rise of industrial societies and 
seeing that they were different from the past. 
We were in the modern era, and were breaking 
from the past of the feudal society or ancient 
societal formations. There began to be a vision 
of the whole. It wasn’t simply the rise of Europe 
or the west, but a sense of the whole global 
system was in motion. And it was a complex 
global transition that we were in. 
So they came up with the idea that we 
needed to see the world as a single system, and 
we needed to in that regard find ways to govern 
it and to make it better. We were optimistic in 
the 19th century about the ability of men or 
women to craft institutions that could move us 
along a path to betterment, and growth and 
progress. We had various attempts to do so. In 
the 19th century, someone said that the first 
effort to build global governance occurred after 
the Napoleonic wars. The congress of Vienna 
after 1815 was a governance system. And of 
course, it lasted for some decades, perhaps even 
a century to the World War I. Further, you have 
the failed efforts of World War I. I teach at 
Princeton at the Woodrow Wilson’s school. My 
school is named after one of the architects of 
that failure, Woodrow Wilson. At the Versailles 
peace conference, the League of Nations did not 
succeed as it was hoped to be a new form of 
governance. Then we tried again after World 
War II. So, my point here is simply that we 
have been working at this for a long time. 
It is not simply the post-World War II 
period where we had this successful effort. But 
indeed after World War II, we had 
multilateralism under American auspices, 
under American leadership, and it was a new 
type of global order building project. It was 
organized around the trilateral world of Europe, 
Japan, and the United States. It was a layered 
cake of institutions. And I have already 
mentioned these institutions; the UN, the 
Bretton Wood Institutions and so forth. It was 
an expansive order. It was easy to join and hard 
to overturn. You had integration into it from 
Eastern Europe, after the Cold War; Southern 
Europe; Latin America; East Asia and so forth. 
Integration, shared leadership, the spread of 
the spoils of modernity. Countries got rich in 
the system. They get accommodated different 
styles; there was the European Social 
Democratic style, the American and British 
Anglo liberal model. And of course, in Asia, 
pioneered by Japan, the state led 
modernization model. So, this order that we 
have seen for the last 70 years has 
accommodated a lot of different types of 
countries. 
Various factors facilitated global 
governance over the last 50 years. One was 
that US itself was powerful and had interests 
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in building global institutions. Secondly, there 
was a wide spread belief that really emerged 
from the 1930s that the world needed to be 
governed in new ways, particularly 
economically; that in the 30s the great 
depression, the spread of protectionism, and 
instability from one economy to the next was 
like a contagion, economic disease, that needed 
to be managed through permanent global 
institutions. That was new. Think of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s message to the Bretton Wood’s 
conference in 1944. That was a message of we 
needed to do things in new ways, permanent 
global governance. You had a core group of like-
minded states, beginning with the Bretton in 
the United States. But then, the larger group 
of democracies; Germany and Japan, and 
eventually the EU. And you had the Cold War 
which was a rather unintended support 
because it created more like-minded 
cooperation among democracies. 
And finally, there was a view. There 
was a view that the world could be taken to a 
better place that a liberal, modernizing world 
would bring more people into the system and 
move them to a higher level of safety and well-
being. And this was, of course, the hope that all 
these things were reinforcing global 
governance. 
Now, I finally turn to the crisis. I 
asked the questions: Are we coming to a 
breakdown or a transition? And I think it’s 
going to be a transition, but there clearly are 
weaknesses in the system that are making it 
harder to achieve global governance. The old 
partners, Germany, Japan and the United 
States, are all part of the alliance system. Now, 
those are not the three key countries. China is 
the key country. India and Brazil are not in an 
alliance system. They come with very different 
experiences, post-colonial, anti-imperial 
experiences, expanding number of countries; 
you need more countries around the table. It 
can't just be Britain and the United States 
organizing the global monetary order, which 
was the case in 1944. You cannot do that today. 
It is going to be harder. You have the China—
US rivalry, which is going to make it very 
difficult. And you finally have finally a new 
skepticism about progress. I do think that 
having the vision, ideology of the future, is 
important for getting countries to agree to 
make short term costs for long term benefits. 
And it’s going to be harder to do that today. 
Finally, looking to the future, the 
future form of governance of multilaterals, we 
are going to discuss later today. So, I'll just say 
very few words, two minutes on this before I 
end. I do think that China and rising states are 
going to want to have some kind of global 
system that is open and rule-based. They want 
to be in it because they benefit from it, and 
countries like China are going to increasingly 
feel that they have a stake in the wellbeing, not 
just of their own country and the security of the 
communist  party, but of the global system 
itself. They, like Japan and the United States, 
50 years ago, realized that they are major 
players in that system. The countries in the 
rising world are not a block. We talked about 
the BRICS. But they are not a block. They are 
countries with many different complex 
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alignments and they share problems that we 
have. 
Brazil worries about clean energy, 
science and technology, infrastructure and 
about education and raising their young people 
in economic inequality. Those are precisely the 
problems that other countries in the old world, 
shall we say, the old countries face. So, we are 
in it together. The problems are not—they are 
complicated problems; we all face these 
problems. We should remember that it is not 
just China, Japan, United States, and Europe; 
but a rising groups of states such as Mexico, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, South Africa, 
and many countries that are all stakeholders. 
They are all pursuing non-violent ways to 
change the system in more beneficial ways. 
Then finally, there isn’t really an 
alternative. Look around the world. Ask people. 
Do they have a better idea for running the 21st 
century? And you will hear silence because 
there isn’t an alternative world where we 
pioneered more complex and far reaching forms 
of multilateral cooperation. That’s the only 
solution to the problems we have. We may not 
get there easily, but we have to go there. There 
is no other destination, and I hope that the 
Hiroshima University’s Institute for Peace 
Science will be part of the academic and 
political discussion of how we make progress, 
moving down that pathway. Thank you very 
much. 
  

































はその最終段階の 3 年間、この仕事をしました。 


























































去に 1978、1982、1988 年の 3 回開催され、一定
の成果があったと評価されていますが、それ以降































































































































核不拡散条約（NPT： Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons）、1972 年の
生物兵器条約、1993 年の化学兵器条約、あるい
は 1996年の核実験に関する包括的核実験禁止条
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President, University of Niigata Prefecture 
Good morning. I am Takashi Inoguchi, 
one of co-organizers of this conference. I am 
very glad that I have been part in contributing 
to the organization of this conference. My 
subject is war occurrence, interdependence, 
and multilateral institutions. If you look at the 
number of war-related deaths since 1938, it’s 
quite simple. This is based on the Stockholm 
Institute’s data. Basically, the World War II 
period, that is, 1938–1945, 5 million per year 
passed away because of the war. Next period, 
the Cold War period, 1945–1989, 100,000 
passed away per year. This is important to 
stress as it is annual data. And then, moving 
into the post-Cold War period, 1989 to 2014, 
10,000 persons were killed in war-related per 
year. This is a dramatic decrease of the number 
of war-related deaths, and you can see it is real. 
But of course the important thing is that we do 
not include the number of war-related deaths 
derived from Civil Wars, and then non-
traditional terrorism or state terrorism, and et 
cetera, only international war-related deaths. 
 If you look at the number of war-
related deaths confining to the East Asian 
region, that is basically Northeast Asia and 
Southeast Asia, and then some of the Pacific 
Islands, virtually zero death, according to Timo 
Kivimäki, a Finnish academic, chronicled and 
then systematically counted the number of 
those war-related deaths since 1980. In 1979 a 
big war between China and Vietnam broke out 
and there was a huge number of war-related 
deaths. But since March 1979, arguably zero. 
Exception is that a Chinese pilot was killed in 
2001 over Hainan Island in relation to the 
United States reconnaissance aircraft because 
Chinese air force wanted to warn US 
reconnaissance aircraft not to fly over Chinese 
territories or territorial space. That is one 
Chinese death in 2001. 
 In 2010, 46 South Korean seamen 
were killed, probably by North Korea. Of course, 
you can say that Chinese Americans are not in 
the war. North and South Korea are not at war 
in a conventional sense. North and South 
Korea are kind of in a civil war endlessly even 
after the armistice agreement of 1953. For 
convenience, if we delete these two incidents, 
there would be zero death in East Asia. That is 
the argument advanced by Timo Kivimäki. But 
you can say, since enormous insecurity and 
tensions abound in this region, I will pick up 
one incidence, which took place in recent time, 
Japan and China. 
 December 26th, 2013 was the 100th 
anniversary of Mr. Mao Zedong. Further, 
December 26th, 2013 is the first anniversary of 
Prime Minister Abe’s second ascend to power. 
So, somehow, President Xi and Prime Minister 
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Abe took certain kind of actions on that day, the 
same day, one hour difference between Tokyo 
and Beijing. But the consequences are huge. 
Upon hearing that Prime Minister Abe did 
something in Tokyo, President Xi basically 
ordered to shut down all the computer-related 
press mechanisms so that the anti-Japanese 
conversations, twitters, or calls for anti-
Japanese actions are suppressed on the same 
day, 26th December. And in not surprisingly, no 
big collective Chinese anti-Japanese 
demonstration took place on 26th and 
thereafter because President Xi was calculated 
that any big scale anti-Japanese collective 
actions on the part of Chinese masses would, 
can metamorphose themselves into anti-
regime, anti-systemic opposition in China. So, 
that was not mobilized. 
 But of course, on the Chinese side, not 
that China did not take any actions, it took 
actions successively. Basically, the Chinese 
Navy started actions against Japanese Coastal 
Guard around the disputed islands 
approximately in January. Later, the Navy took 
actions to liberate the use of fire control radar 
on the Chinese Navy ships against Japanese 
Coastal guard and Naval ships. So, that was a 
big alarm to not only Japan but also everybody. 
And then on the first day of February, a little 
surprisingly, Jiefang Jun bao, newspaper of 
People’s Liberation Army, carried an article 
penned by the Chinese Air Force saying that 
the Chinese Air Force conducted simulation in 
which the Chinese air force versus the US 
Japan team combined air forces waged battles 
each other. And then, it reported that Chinese 
dealt a complete defeat. The US–Japan was 
much stronger. And it was reported as if it is 
reporting their experimental simulation in the 
context of Chinese Navy’s very coercive action 
against Japanese coastal guards.  
 And then a few days after that, this 
fire control radar was relaxed somehow. Then, 
of course, everybody was relieved. The Chinese 
Air Force came in to the scene. Having declared 
the Air Defense Identification Zone in the East 
China Sea in 2012, they took what it is called 
the unusual approach to a Japanese aircraft. 
That was around February or March. Both in 
Japan as well as the rest of the world, they are 
worried because the tension was very high, 
very precarious, very difficult, and easy to start 
violent conflicts. Then, suddenly on April the 
26th, the multilateral conference was held in 
Qingdao, Shandong, China. And then 22 
countries were joined by China on the banning 
of the use of fire control radar. It was agreed by 
multilateral conference involving China as well. 
 So, this is one of the instances where 
multilateral institutional mechanism has 
worked. But of course, it does not ensure 
whether in the future this kind of mechanism 
works. It is still very precarious, somehow. The 
team of Kivimäki says that East Asia's long 
peace but it is very long peace but very 
precarious peace and then here I think that 
multilateral institutions do work positively to 
prevent war from taking place. 
 And that’s my story. And then 
probably, you may look at and investigate the 
content of this Qingdao conference, Qingdao 
agreement, and also internal decision making 
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in China. Of course, it is not easily known. But 
at least on December 26th 2013 onward very 
busy discussion was made and a debate was 
held in China and a very tough and aggressive 
policy was taken by the navy, suddenly by air 
force and then moving to the more peaceful 
outcome. So since then, of course, it is not the 
end. In summer, 2014, earlier this year, the 
Chinese took actions in the South China Sea. 
They started constructing oil rigging 
infrastructure in the South China Sea. It lasted 
a few weeks. And then after few weeks, they 
declared that the construction was complete. 
And then somehow, peace, probably precarious 
peace prevailed until now. But of course, the 
structure is very difficult. My point is that 
multilateral mechanism has worked. Let us 
hope this mechanism will remain to be useful 
for the purpose of non-occurrence of war in East 
Asia as well. Thank you very much. 
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第Ⅱ部  混沌とする世界における国際機関の強化 
 
Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing  
When We Need it Most 
 
                                                 
David Held 
Professor, University College, Durham University 
 
Good morning and thank you to the 
organizers, if I can see them around here, for 
having me here and giving me the flowers. The 
question I want to ask in the 20 minutes I have 
is a little different compared with the questions 
asked earlier today. We can summarize the first 
three papers a little on the theme: why do 
states cooperate. I want to readdress a different 
question. I want to ask why do they fail to 
cooperate or to put it more mildly, why don’t 
they cooperate enough. And if you look at this 
curve in a minute of projected emissions, the 
developed world is projected to flat line really 
between now, with slight increases to 2049. But 
look where the real drive in push for climate 
emissions would come from; Brazil, China, 
Indonesia, India, and South Africa with the 
rest of non-Annex 1 countries rising as well. 
This tells us that we have to cooperate. There 
is no global solution for the 21st century 
without global collaboration. And yet, today 
what I want to talk about is why we are not 
getting sufficient global cooperation. 
So let me just start for fun with a 
familiar metaphor, which is this one: Dwight 
Eisenhower, a former US general who served 
as Supreme Commander of allied forces in 
Europe, was in fact the driving force behind the 
US highway system. As a young lieutenant, he 
had been very impressed by the German road 
system, the autobahn system, and wanted to 
test how long it would take a mechanized 
column to go from Washington to San Francisco. 
This experiment failed spectacularly because it 
took around 65 days. What he discovered was 
that the road system of the United States at 
around the period of the Second World War was 
quite inadequate for a modern large scale 
contemporary society. And Eisenhower’s 
experiment was partly behind the drive of the 
US highway system. The US highway system 
spread throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s 
and is generally argued to be one of the reasons 
for the post-war boom. The creations of that 
infrastructure allowed American social 
mobility, people mobility, commercial mobility, 
and so on, integrating the US in multiple ways. 
But of course, what is a very good idea in the 
one time period, building more roads, can later 
on easily become a very bad idea. 
So, what traffic planners have 
discovered today is that building more roads 
just creates more traffic. So, the Eisenhower’s 
solution of an interstate highway system in the 
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post-war period no longer works. All traffic 
planners will tell you today that if you build 
more roads, you incentivize more traffic, and 
thus you will get more congestion. What we 
discover in US today is that Americans sit in 
their cars about 7 billion hours more than 
necessary every year; they spend billions, 
hundreds of billions of dollars more than 
necessary on fuel, costing those hundreds of 
billions of dollars over all. And what is true 
here, in the US, is also true in Moscow, São 
Paulo, and Beijing. Beijing recently celebrated 
or China recently "celebrated" the first 
hundred mile queue. What I am basically 
saying here through this story is that the 
solution to a problem in one time period can 
produce second order consequences, even 
second order consequences of success which 
undermines original solution. It was good to 
build roads. It enhanced mobility. More road-
building created more traffic which choked the 
solution. 
And this is a metaphor, a story about 
what I wanted to say more broadly. Because 
what I should essentially argue is that the post-
war institutional order, I accept John’s point, of 
course, it goes back to the late 19th century. 
But essentially, the post-war institutional 
order here with its founding moment was 
critical to creating a form of governance in 
globalization. And it was hugely successful, so 
successful that it has now begun to erode itself. 
So, we have moved from an institutional order 
creating enormous economic and political 
prosperity to one increasingly characterized by 
gridlock, traffic congestion, to carry on the 
metaphor. So the question is why? 
In agreement after agreement, 
international negotiation after international 
negotiation, we do not see success in many of 
them as pressing negotiations; we see failures. 
The Doha Trade Round has come to an end 
without major agreement. 20 years of climate 
negotiations involving tens of thousands of 
people every year have reached a point where 
they agree that extra time is necessary to reach 
an agreement. Syria, 180,000 people dead. In 
Syria, already 5 million people displaced, the 
security issue developing there faster than we 
can almost track it, and the international 
community is paralyzed. Why? Why in one area 
after another? Are we not getting agreement? 
We are getting fundamental disagreements? 
What explains this? 
What I want to suggest is that the 
gridlock we find, like traffic congestion, 
gridlock. The gridlock we find in international 
negotiations has to be understood in terms of 
the very success. It is the paradox of the post-
war period. So let me try and I will explain that 
as best I can. Global cooperation today is 
gridlocked across a range of areas. It is not so 
because previous phases of institution building 
at the international level were unsuccessful, on 
the contrary, they were very successful. But 
like too much traffic, they produced second 
order consequences of success. So let’s try to 
understand this step by step. 
To understand why gridlock has come 
about it is important to understand how it was. 
The post-Second World War era facilitated 
what I called a period of governed globalization. 
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We cannot underestimate how the political 
leaders at the time of 1945 faced the historical 
situation that was almost unprecedented. Two 
calamitous world wars in the first half of the 
20th century, a great depression that had 
driven the world economy practically over the 
edge, and faced with rising unemployment, two 
world wars, and extraordinary vision, which we 
of course see in Hiroshima in the museum just 
next to us, of what it is that human beings are 
capable of doing to each other. These people 
had an opportunity faced with that startling 
nightmare which of course was the reality of 
the first half of the 20th century to create a set 
of institutions that would put global peace and 
prosperity at its heart. And they did it well. It 
you read the speeches of the foundation of the 
UN it is very clear, these were not the 
architects without a clear purpose. These were 
the architects of institutions with a very clear 
purpose. May the first half of the 20th century 
never repeat again in terms of war and 
economic chaos. 
Let us shape the second half of the 
20th century around global peace and global 
prosperity. And indeed, the institutions that 
were created, I think particularly of course of 
the UN and The Bretton Woods Institutions are 
essential to the story that unfolds. Sufficient 
institutional stability after 1945 was created 
through these institutional structures to create 
waves of economic prosperity that 
characterized the last 70 years. Although it is 
by no means the sole course, I think we can say 
that the UN and The Bretton Woods 
Institutions, essential to the story, helping to 
create conditions under which decolonization, 
successive ways of democratization, successive 
ways of economic globalization, could take root 
profoundly altering world politics. While the 
economic record of post-war period varies, of 
course, by country, and by region, many 
countries, and many regions experienced 
significant economic growth and living 
standards rose rapidly across the world. 
By the late 1980s, of course, a variety 
of East Asian countries including Japan were 
beginning to grow at unprecedented speeds. By 
the late 1990s, China and Brazil had gained 
extraordinary economic momentum, a process 
that continues till today. When I first went to 
China 30 years ago, there was one 
departmental store in the middle of Beijing. If 
you wanted to buy luxury goods to take home 
as presents, you had to have a foreign passport 
or be a member of the communist party to get 
the access to the top floors, where you would 
find nothing. You couldn’t find an average store 
anywhere else. Today, departmental stores 
cover Beijing. BMWs and Mercedes choke the 
roads. Something extraordinary has happened, 
but it is also trickled down: 400 million people 
lifted out of poverty in less than 30 years. The 
world has seen nothing like it. 
And the argument I want to make to 
you goes something like this. The post-war 
institutions created a cycle of almost self-
reinforcing global interdependence. The post-
war institutions created conditions under 
which a multitude of actors benefitted from 
establishing companies, creating multinational 
companies, investing abroad, developing global 
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production chains, and engaging in a huge 
range of activities we think of when we use the 
word globalization. These conditions changed 
the nature of the world economy, radically 
increasing the dependence of people across 
every corner of the world. So, it created a world 
of ever deepening complex interdependence. 
That was triggered by the post-war 
institutional structure, driven by changes in 
technologies and capitalisms inherent logic of 
expansion, which created demands for more 
institutions, which created more self-
interdependence, creating a cycle, this virtuous 
circle of self-reinforcing interdependence. 
I am not saying that international 
institutions were the only cause of the dynamic 
form of globalization experience in the post-war 
period. Changes in the nature of capitalism, of 
course, breakthroughs in technologies, above 
all, information technology are obviously 
drivers of critical interdependence. But I am 
saying is none of that could have taken place 
without the fact that we created a set of 
institutions that were relatively open, peaceful, 
liberal, and institutionalized. And it is that 
structure which was pivotal to the explosive 
growth of globalization in the second half of the 
20th century. By preventing or helping to 
prevent another world war, and by helping to 
prevent another great depression, the 
multilateral order did as much for global 
interdependence as microprocessor or e-mail. 
But self-reinforcing interdependence, I 
wanted to suggest to you, reaches a point when 
it damages our ability to cooperate further, a 
paradox. Why? I want to explain why this 
virtuous circle has come to a grinding 
shuttering stop. And there are four reasons for 
it. Each one of these is partly a result of the 
success of that very institutional structure 
itself. So, these are second order consequence. 
The pathways to gridlocks in international 
systems are the second order consequences of 
success. 
Let’s start with emerging 
multipolarity, and I need to take a moment to 
explain this argument to you. The absolute 
number of states has increased by some 300% 
in the last 70 years, meaning that, the basic 
transaction cost of global governance have 
grown: More states, more complexity, more cost 
attached to negotiations. But more importantly 
than that, much more importantly, the number 
of states that matter on a given issue to get an 
agreement has grown by similar proportions. 
Let me give you an example. At Bretton Woods 
in 1945 when the Bretton Institution was 
created, the rules of the world economy could 
largely be set by the United States in 
conjunction with the UK and some 
confrontation with European partners. That 
was it. By the time you get to the global 
financial crisis in 2007–2009, it is the G20 that 
has become the principal for global economic 
discussions, not because the great powers 
necessarily desired to be more inclusive. I don’t 
think they did, it wasn’t charity. It wasn’t 
inclusiveness. It wasn’t a democratic impasse, 
but because they could not solve the problem of 
global financial crisis on their own. 
So, we shifted from a world order in 
which a small club of nations could create the 
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rules of the global system to one in which global 
interdependence meant many more countries 
are as equally significant in determining what 
will happen next. It is clear now that many 
more countries than in earlier periods 
representing a bigger diverse array of interests 
must agree for global cooperation to occur. 
Let me just give you an example. You 
look at trade negotiations of 25 -- over the 
periods of 1946. Successive rounds of trade 
negotiations created agreements. But there 
were relatively few countries in those 
agreements focused on relatively simple issues. 
23, 13, 38, tariff, tariff, tariff. By the time you 
get to the present period, you get ever larger 
number of countries that have to agree around 
issues that have become much more complex. 
Let me go on to the second question. I 
have been told that I have got five minutes. I 
will never finish this argument in five minutes. 
But I will just, let me just go back and do my 
best to give you a fuller account. The second 
issue is institutional inertia. The post-war 
order succeeded in part because it did 
incentivize the great power to participate in the 
global order. Unlike the League of Nations' 
respect, spoken about earlier this morning, the 
wisdom of the founders of 1945 architectural 
institutions was that while they wanted them 
to engage all countries, they recognized in less 
incentivize the great powers to stay in, they 
would not stay in. But the problem with the 
institutional structures and the 1945 
settlement is that the architects of the post-war 
order did not in many cases design those 
institutions to organically change with 
fluctuations in global power. The result is that 
we have rising multipolarity with institutions 
often stuck in the power structure of the 1945. 
Let me take you to the third issue, 
harder problems. As the interdependence has 
deepened, so have the range of issues we have 
to negotiate, over deepened. Was 
interdependence the light, the issues were 
simple. Trade, open trade creates one barrier, 
tariffs. But once interdependence got deeper 
and deeper, the issues around creating an open 
economy become more complex. It is not trade. 
It is all these other sets of issues, non-tariff 
barriers, agriculture, labor standards, 
environmental, and so on that cut right across 
the domestic agenda of the countries. So, global 
interdependence now bites deeply into 
domestic agendas of individual countries. So 
you have more countries at the table with often 
diverse interests having to deal with global 
issues of cooperation that cut deeply into the 
value preferences, and around that, they often 
will not find agreement. 
One more example is climate. Think 
of climate. I am old enough to have gone to 
school at the time in which you couldn’t see 
your hand in front of your face. If you are a kid, 
that was smoke in London. Smoke could be 
cleared up by relatively small number of 
countries agreeing to phase out a particular 
kind of coal. With clear technological 
alternatives that are cheaply available, non-
smoke, smoke free coal, and so you had a small 
number of countries agreeing to collaborate 
with clearly available alternative technology. 
Scale up to climate change today, and 
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none of those conditions apply. The divergence 
of voice in interests within the developed and 
developing worlds along with sheer complexity 
of the issues meant that it is very hard to drive 
that curve down. The issues are just much 
more complex. 
And now, let’s go finally to 
fragmentation. I won't say much about this now, 
given the time, but it is the fourth area to 
gridlock. The architects of 1945 started 
essentially with a blank slate. Today, we have 
a multiple complex set of international 
institutions, multilateral and transnational, 
often there is no coordination. It is now 
estimated that 80% of the aide for the great 
Tsunami missed its targets. This was countries 
scrambling to be effective, countries 
scrambling in front of their own television 
cameras to convince their own electorates they 
are being effective and a fundamental lack of 
coordination of those efforts, this scaled up in 
many examples. 
So what I’m simply stressing is that 
there are four pathways today that explain 
gridlock in international institutions. This is a 
very different world order to 1945. There are 
more voices with more interests. The 
institutions are set and hard to change, the 
problems are harder to solve. So, it is not at all 
surprising that we get gridlock in critical 
international institutions. The trouble is that 
we need time to solve gridlock, time to reshape 
our institutions, but this does not give us time 
at all. 
And here is another paradox, that the 
world economy and everything that comes with 
it changes of the huge space, at a huge velocity 
but our culture and our systems' 
representation remains tied to place and 
locality. So, we live with a paradox. On one 
hand our global systems of economic change 
are spread out, but identities and systems 
representation remains stubbornly local, and 
in that gap, we have the gridlock problem. 
Summit is not all bleak. There are pathways 
beyond gridlock for which I haven't had much 
time to discuss. Of course social movements put 
new issues on the agenda. But they find it hard 
to convert the pressure into institution 
building. Think of the Arab Spring, from Arab 
Spring to Arab Nightmare. Institutions 
adaptation occurs. Think of the shift between 
G1 as I called the United States to G5, G7, and 
G20. It is an example of institutional 
adaptation. 
Institutional reform is harder. At the 
edge of the financial crisis, it seems as if the 
global financial transaction tasks might 
happen and some reform of the UN Security 
Council might occur. But as soon as the system 
was sufficiently stabilized, institutional reform 
dropped off the agenda. And then there is the 
issue of strong leadership. Where will it come 
from to reshape our institutions? The EU is 
increasingly dogged by internal preoccupations, 
and now by the rise of xenophobic and 
nationalistic parties. Congress in the United 
States is often gridlocked, and is hard to push 
major institutional changes through. China is 
increasingly preoccupied with legitimacy that 
comes from its own economic growth. So, where 
will global leadership come from? If I had time, 
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I would give you another 20 minutes on 
pathways beyond gridlock, but I don’t. So, I will 
sit down. Many thanks. 
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Introduction 
In my remarks, I will first touch on the 
evolving global situation. Then, I will 
mention about the development challenges 
that the world is facing today. Bearing these 
in mind, I will talk about the role of the 
United Nations in relation to the post-2015 
development agenda that is now being 
prepared and discussed at the United Nations 
General Assembly. The post-2015 
development agenda will be a global 
framework for the years 2016–2030 to 
eradicate poverty, improve the standard of 
living of people, and to have sustainable 
development in all parts of the world. This 
development agenda will be approved at the 
Heads of State and Government Summit 
meeting at the United Nations in September 
2015. 
 
Evolving Global Context 
I will first start with the evolving global 
context, and I can see that some of the points 
were already mentioned by previous speakers. 
In considering development cooperation, 
what are the notable changes that have taken 
place in the world over the recent years? 
One, we live in a highly interconnected 
world where one country’s actions affect the 
neighboring country, the region, and globally 
– today and in the future. Two, emerging 
economies, including BRICS and other 
developing countries, yield stronger influence 
and power in the world, both economically 
and politically. Three, non-state actors, 
notably civil society and the private sector, 
have become stronger forces and are more 
actively involved in global issues and 
development cooperation. Four, significant 
progress has been made in global poverty 
reduction and in some Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs are 
globally agreed eight goals to reduce poverty 
and improve health, education, gender 
equality, and other development situations by 
the year 2015. Progress is made in some areas. 
But progress is lagging behind in other MDG 
areas, and they require concerted efforts. 
Inequality is worsening, and it is a serious 
problem. Fifth, the composition of financial 
flows to developing countries has changed 
dramatically. In 1990, total global ODA was 
the major resource flow. In 2010, foreign 
direct investment was about $550 billion, 
remittances were $174 billion, ODA was $129 
billion, and private philanthropic flows were 
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$53 billion. ODA now constitutes a much 
smaller proportion of flow to developing 
countries. 
 
Development Challenges Facing Us 
Against this context, what are the key 
development challenges that we are facing 
currently and in the future? The recent 
proposal on the sustainable development 
goals (SDGs) provides an indication of such 
development issues. The United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development 
(Rio+20) that took place in Brazil in 2012 
agreed to establish an intergovernmental 
open working group on SDGs. Following a 
series of meetings, the open working group 
came up with a proposal on the SDGs that 
contains a set of 17 goals and 169 targets. 
These are now being discussed at the UN 
General Assembly. 
The SDGs will form an integral part of the 
post-2015 development agenda. Once this 
development agenda is approved, it will serve 
as a global common development framework 
covering the next fifteen years as a successor 
of the MDGs that will complete in 2015. The 
SDGs build on the unfinished business of the 
MDGs, and propose goals on poverty and 
hunger eradication, education, health, gender 
equality, infrastructure, energy, employment 
and decent work, human settlements, the 
environment including climate change, and 
other issues related to sustainable 
development. 
The post-2015 development agenda would 
be universally applicable to all countries. 
This is different from the MDGs, in which 
seven of the eight goals were meant for 
developing countries. Overall, the SDGs 
proposal is more comprehensive and more 
ambitious compared to the Millennium 
Development Goals. It aims to “leave no one 
behind”, end poverty, and end hunger. New 
features include goals to reduce inequalities 
within and among countries as well as to 
promote peaceful and inclusive societies and 
governance. 
The implementation of the post-2015 
development agenda that includes the SDGs 
requires robust global partnerships with the 
active engagement of governments, 
international organizations, civil society, the 
private sector, academic and scientific 
communities, the media, and other 
stakeholders. Based on the shared 
understanding of the threats, challenges, and 
opportunities of the various development 
issues, collective action is required at all 
levels — global, regional, national and local.  
 
The Role of the UN in Post-2015 Development 
Agenda 
Bearing in mind the global context and the 
development challenges that I just mentioned, 
what role should the United Nations play in 
relation to the post-2015 development 
agenda? 
One: as convening power and setting global 
agenda, standards, and targets. The UN has 
been providing a platform for formulating and 
promoting new development approaches and 
goals. It played a critical role in the 
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Millennium Summit in 2000 at which 189 
world leaders adopted the Millennium 
Declaration committing to make this world a 
better place to live, and the subsequent 
agreement on the Millennium Development 
Goals. The UN is now playing an 
instrumental role in bringing global 
consensus on the SDGs and the post-2015 
development agenda. The UN, with its unique 
and universal legitimacy and convening 
power, must continue and play an even 
stronger role in global agenda-setting and 
norm-setting as well as in forging agreement 
of common targets. 
Second: monitoring progress on global goals. 
The UN has been playing an important role in 
monitoring progress on global goals through 
preparation of reports such as the annual 
MDGs reports. With its global reach and 
information gathering and coordination 
capabilities, the UN is suited to play this 
monitoring role, publishing data and 
information that enables country comparison. 
This monitoring role should be accompanied 
by stronger advocacy actions to accelerate the 
progress of the development agenda. 
Third: undertaking development 
cooperation activities. Once global 
agreements on the MDGs are reached, 
development cooperation activities toward 
the goals have been mostly carried out at the 
country level in developing countries. 
Coherence of the UN agencies ’ activities, 
working together as one UN system, the so-
called “Delivering as One” has been 
strengthening over the years. Continuous 
efforts are needed to bring about more 
coherence of country level activities, 
enhancing comparative advantages and 
synergies among the UN agencies thereby 
increasing efficiency. 
Fourth: forging transformational 
partnerships with diverse partners. Let us 
now turn our mind to think beyond the UN, 
and consider the global scene. 
With the emerging economies gaining a 
greater role and influence internationally, 
their voices and representation should be 
appropriately reflected within international 
organizations' decision making system. In 
fact, this should be pursued beyond the 
organization level. The current system of 
global governance requires rethinking and 
recalibration. We need a more inclusive 
international governance that accommodates 
the growing diversity in voice and power. This 
point was also mentioned by previous 
speakers. This is becoming even more 
important as we need broader and stronger 
partnerships to tackle the complex set of 
global issues that can be solved only by 
collective action. 
As mentioned earlier, civil society has 
grown rapidly with great dynamism. The IT 
revolution and instant connectivity have had 
a strong impact on their activities and 
outreach. Then, the private sector, which is a 
key to development activities, is becoming an 
even stronger enabler and accelerator of 
development. Their business activities are 
having a strong effect on improving the lives 
of great many people in developing countries. 
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Philanthropy has also seen a rapid growth 
over the last two decades, making substantial 
financial contribution in some development 
areas. 
How can the power of these dynamic 
partners be mobilized, harnessed, and 
maximized for poverty eradication and other 
development gains? The emerging economies 
must assume greater responsibilities and 
leadership roles in tackling global issues. 
This would include policy dialogue and 
increased contribution of resources for global 
issues. They should use their collective power 
to improve people’s lives as stated in the 
communiqué agreed by the G20 leaders 
earlier this month. The private sector with its 
significant financial and human resources, 
technology, and research capabilities is a 
formidable force that can contribute much 
more to improve the lives of people. They too, 
must assume greater responsibilities and 
leadership in tackling developmental issues. 
The UN must use its convening power and 
platform to bring these dynamic actors 
together to hold active dialogue and forge a 
transformational global partnership. The 
existing partnership frameworks such as the 
UN Global Compact should be leveraged for 
scaling up activities. 
Fifth: financing for development. The 
implementation of the post-2015 development 
agenda requires significant amount of 
resources. Financing for development is 
another area that involves diverse partners. 
ODA of course remains very important. 
However, bearing in mind its diminishing 
share in financial flows to developing 
countries, perhaps it is time to direct it more 
selectively to the world’s poorest people and 
to those countries that critically need this 
particular form of international assistance ―
such as the fragile states that are in a state of 
conflict, or have just come out of conflict. The 
rapidly growing developing countries should 
“graduate” from ODA and become donors or 
supporters of other developing countries 
through South–South cooperation. Domestic 
resource mobilization in developing countries 
should be promoted further. Foreign 
investment in developing countries has a 
great potential to grow further. 
Innovative finance such as new global taxes 
also merits consideration. Here again, the UN 
should play a key role in bringing the diverse 
actors together to discuss and forge 
partnerships on how to direct additional 
resources for development. I do hope that the 
Third Financing for Development Conference 
to be held in Ethiopia next year will come up 
with forward-looking and practical 
arrangements. 
The year 2015 offers a unique opportunity 
as Heads of State and Government Summit 
meeting will be held at the United Nations in 
New York to decide on the post-2015 
development agenda, as I mentioned earlier. 
In the same year, other UN sponsored 
global conferences of key importance will take 
place, including the Third United Nations 
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction 
in Sendai in Japan, and the UN Climate 
Change Conference (COP21) in Paris.  
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Multilateralism will be put to a test next 
year, as discussions intensify and culminate 
in major milestone decisions affecting our 
lives for the next decade and beyond. All 
member states, including Japan, and other 
stakeholders must do the utmost towards 
reaching ambitious agreements. 
The 21st century is full of challenges that 
are complex. At the same time, the dynamic 
forces that are unleashed and at interplay in 
the world today offer us great potentials and 
opportunities. How they will work together in 
a synergistic manner based on their 
comparative advantages is critical. The 
United Nations and its agencies can and 
should strengthen their role of not just being 
a facilitator, promoter, and supporter, but also 
being an initiator and creator of new ideas, 
concepts and approaches.  
The UN should also be a strong advocator 
and attention-caller on issues that require the 
attention of world leaders. Moreover, the 
United Nations should play the role of a 
“strong accelerator” to bring about a dynamic 
transformation of global partnerships to 
address the development challenges. 
Partnerships and collective action are the key. 
The strong role of the United Nations is 
critically needed now more than ever, not only 
to agree on the ambitious post-2015 
development agenda, but also to implement it 
and to reach the goals contained therein to 
significantly improve people’s lives around 
the world.  
Thank you very much. 
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第Ⅲ部 ヒロシマは何ができるのか？  
 
MULTILATERALISM IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: 
Meeting Grand Global Challenges 
 
 
Brian D. Finlay 
Managing Director, the Stimson Center 
 
Thank you so much. I am going to try 
to provide a brief and perhaps slightly more 
upbeat assessment of the future of 
multilateralism and the role of multilateral 
organizations moving forward, and I hope you 
have heard to date or thus far. In 1970, India’s 
Gross Domestic Product was a paltry $61 
billion. Since the country’s independence in 
1947, it had virtually remained, by any 
measure, a developing country. It had very high 
rates of illiteracy, the poverty levels were 
extreme and overall growth of the economy 
rested somewhere in the 1960s around 3% per 
year. Now, that may seem rather enviable by 
today’s standards, but bear in mind that at that 
time in 1960, Japan’s growth rate rested at 
around 13% annually. However, in the late 
1980s something began to change it. 
Economic liberalization drove foreign 
direct investments, which had rested in 1970 at 
around $45 million annually upward. And by 
2006, between 1970 and 2006, foreign direct 
investment ballooned to an astonishing $17 
billion annually. The Gross Domestic Product 
of India similarly rose and the multinational 
firms from around the world began to pour 
resources into the country. Microsoft, IBM, 
Hitachi, Mitsubishi, all poured, as I said, 
resources and people into the country. The 
result across the board was that the average 
Indian citizen was better off. There was a deep 
disparity, of course, which continues till today. 
But in general, in gross terms, the average 
Indian citizens became much better off over the 
course of that period. 
Over just two short decades, India 
had successfully transformed itself into a 
global technology and knowledge hub in terms 
of the global supply chain. So, it came as a great 
shock when in December 2001, a group of 
heavily armed terrorists known to operate from 
Pakistan stormed the Indian parliament. As a 
result of the 30-minute firefight at the Indian 
Parliament, 12 people died. 
And over the course of the next 10 
months, a crisis ensued between India and 
Pakistan. Over the course of that period, 1 
million individual soldiers were deployed to the 
border between India and Pakistan. At various 
times over the course of that period, a brief 
border skirmishes resulted and it appeared 
twice that India and Pakistan would cross the 
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nuclear threshold. There was a very real fear 
that in the early part of the last decade a 
nuclear exchange was possible between India 
and Pakistan. Fortunately, the standoff ended 
in minimal casualties in 2002. Not only was 
there no conventional war, but also there was 
no crossing; obviously because of the much-
feared nuclear threshold between the two 
countries. 
The official story of the de-escalation 
of that crisis goes as follows. Over the course of 
a 10-month period, the US Deputy Secretary of 
State, Richard Armitage; and the UN Secretary 
General engaged in an intense period of 
shuttled diplomacy between Islamabad and 
New Delhi. And as a result of that, the story 
goes, crisis resulted in defuse and the rest of 
the story is, of course, a history. But there is 
another side, an untold side of that story as 
well. 
In May 2002, a travel advisory was 
issued by the US Department of the State as 
well as by other governments, foreign 
governments. They urged their citizens to leave 
India and Pakistan fearing that a nuclear 
exchange was imminently possible. With tens 
of thousands of foreign workers in the country, 
the advisory had very serious implications for 
business operations, i.e., for all of these 
companies I have mentioned just a moment ago. 
So while the US Deputy Secretary of State and 
the United Nations Secretary General engaged 
in their shuttled diplomacy, the CEOs of dozens 
of companies—United Technologies, General 
Dynamics, General Electric, Delta Airlines, 
American Express—all got together and 
engaged in some diplomacy of their own. 
The message to the leaders of India 
and Pakistan was very clear. We have invested 
much in your countries much for the course of 
the past decade and a half. This conflict is bad 
for our business and the global economy. If we 
leave, we will not return. Almost 
instantaneously, the conflict deescalated. Now, 
I agree with you that you may argue that 
business pressure was certainly far from the 
only factor to defuse the belligerence vigilance 
between India and Pakistan. I would argue 
that the companies may have had a greater 
impact in defusing the crisis than Washington 
and perhaps even the United Nations, and that 
these companies helped to avoid a nuclear 
exchange in South Asia, speaks to the changing 
rules of multilateralism, and the changing role 
of private citizens and companies in managing 
the grand global challenges of our time. 
Now those who work in and with 
governments and multilateral organizations 
like the United Nations and all who preceded 
us, in fact, have a common lament. The lament 
being that seeming futility of engaging these 
huge bureaucracies, these large institutions to 
force change, rather it is encouraging your local 
prefecture to put in a bike lane in your town or 
encouraging the nuclear armed powers to 
engage in general and complete nuclear 
disarmament. The endemic inability of one 
individual or even one small group to have an 
impact and make a change has played human 
kind from time immemorial, and this reality is, 
of course, only exasperated by the very gridlock 
that Professor Held mentioned in his 
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presentation earlier today. 
What I want to suggest is that all of 
that is changing, and changing very quickly. 
We are in the midst of, what I believe is, a new 
multilateralism that is based not on the greater 
willingness of governments and multilateral 
institutions to engage, but rather upon the 
changing global reality that is transforming 
the authority of states and large, excuse me, 
challenging and indeed changing the global 
reality that and transferring authority from 
the state and multilateral institutions like the 
UN into empowered individuals, companies, 
faith-based groups, and issue-based consortia 
around the world. 
Now, this can have negative impacts. 
Think of the rise of Al-Qaeda or ISIS; it is an 
overwhelmingly positive trend. Our ability to 
push these institutions and organizations 
today is unparalleled in human history. I would 
like to illustrate this point by using a few 
examples. I am going to list just three in the 
brief time that I have. The current Ebola 
epidemic is of course the largest that we have 
experienced in our history. It has affected 
multiple countries, concentrated obviously in 
the Western Africa, but has the potential to 
become of course, as we have already realized, 
a truly global epidemic. As of this morning, the 
World Health Organization reported that 5420 
people have died from Ebola as a result of this 
most recent outbreak; with another 15,000 
infections worldwide, again, concentrated in 
the Western Africa. 
Previous incidence of global epidemics 
have been identified and managed by national 
authorities and by international organizations 
including the World Health Organization. And 
that is no different in this case. In the current 
Ebola crisis, those same national authorities 
are deeply involved in managing the crisis. 
What is different today is that the private 
capital is the third largest contributor to global 
relief efforts in this Ebola crisis. The resources 
of one man, Bill Gates, has been credited and is 
largely reportedly responsible for halting the 
contagion in Africa’s most populist country, 
Nigeria. Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook fame 
has contributed more than $25 million to the 
efforts. IKEA, Swedish furniture store, another 
$7 million, where WHO is slow and resource 
poor, for all of the reasons that we have 
discussed previously this morning, and 
encumbered by bureaucracy, frustrated by lack 
of innovation, these individuals and 
corporations are reshaping and improving how 
international assistance is being delivered by 
the WHO and independently. But most 
importantly together they are saving tens of 
thousands of lives around the planet. This I 
think is a vivid demonstration of the future 
that was described by Yuga sensei in her 
presentation. 
Now, international public health is 
not the only beneficiary of this new found 
permeability, I would suggest of 
multilateralism. The unregulated flow of 
weapons around the globe has long destroyed 
lives, negatively reshaping societies and 
destroying opportunities for millions of the 
world’s inhabitants. Until recently, no 
international rules, or set of rules were 
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imposed upon this trade. Shamefully, the 
global trade in bananas was more heavily 
regulated by the international community of 
nations than were conventional weapons. It is 
worth noting that arms trade is a truly global 
business. Every country plays a role in the 
global arms trade. Every country plays a role 
in the global arms trade. 
An aircraft that is assembled in Egypt 
may be built in China and Pakistan with parts 
from the United States and the United 
Kingdom, using technologies innovated in 
Japan, those components transit ports and 
many more other countries. They are carried by 
ships registered in other countries and are still 
are financed and insured in still more countries. 
So, as I say, every country, without exception 
was and is complicit in some way in the global 
flow of arms. Now, the horror of that 
unregulated global arms trade has been readily 
apparent for generations as has its negative 
impact on human security, on economic 
development, on corruption, and so forth. Yet, 
by the mid-2000s, shamefully, only three 
countries actively supported a global treaty 
that would control unregulated transfer and 
sale of conventional weapons. Those three 
countries were Costa Rica, Cambodia, and Mali. 
So, in the last decade of coalition, not 
of governments but of non-governmental, 
organizations came together. And they came 
together to push for an arms trade treaty. They 
called for a legally binding set of rules, 
designed to inhibit the unchecked flow of 
conventional weapons around the globe. 
They began with a global public 
awareness campaign. You may recall the one 
million faces campaign which in turn gave 
away to the so-called people's consultations in 
more than 50 countries around the world. 
These consultations were designed to develop 
personal impact stories to begin to tell the story 
in a very human way of how the unregulated 
trade in weapons was impacting not only 
individuals, but also the dramatic impact, 
economic impact the arms trade had on the 
global economy. 
Now, wisely, the coalition also built 
bridges to the arms industry itself. Many 
painted the arms industry as inherently bad, 
and many companies are. But most companies 
were not. The good guys wanted a level playing 
field. They did not want their products used for 
ill and for human reasons, not only for human 
reasons, but also for solid business reasons. In 
short, they were convinced that an arms trade 
treaty could be, if negotiated appropriately, 
good for business. This coalition also built 
bridges to the faith-based communities—
churches, synagogues, mosques—who began 
lobbying their governments and the United 
Nations from a moral high ground. 
The early success of this coalition was 
found in 2009, when the United Nation itself 
recognized the need for a global arms trade 
treaty and negotiations began. As Ambassador 
Amano, I think can, as well as Ambassador 
Nishida can personally attest, it was a 
painstakingly slow process, but it eventually 
lead in cooperation with the government of 
Japan. I might add to a new global treaty that 
enhances transparency and creates a new flow 
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to help choke off the illicit trade in arms. That 
treaty will enter into force this Christmas, 
marking the first time in our human history 
that the global flow of weapons will meet 
common standards around the world. It is also 
a telling example I would suggest of the 
changing phase of multilateralism itself and 
the growing capacity for each of us in this room 
to have an impact and ultimately alter history 
itself. 
Third, no country and no city better 
understands the horror of nuclear weapons 
than the people of Hiroshima. Increasingly, the 
globalization of technology of raw materials 
and the know-how is pushing the capability to 
contribute to the proliferation supply chain 
into more hands in more countries in more 
corners of the globe than in any other point in 
our human history. North Korea may grab the 
headlines today as the recent proliferator. But 
every country around the globe has the 
capacity to contribute to proliferation, even if 
they lack the intent. So, even the most 
committed governments working alone cannot 
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. That’s true today, and it will 
become even truer in the future. 
So, how is proliferation occurring? 
How did North Korea ultimately build a 
weapons program? How is Iran purportedly 
developing its nuclear weapons program? And 
how could terrorist organization ultimately, 
potentially, obtain a nuclear weapon itself? The 
proliferation supply chain is composed of tens 
of thousands of separate links represented not 
only by the nuclear industry itself, but a wide 
spectrum of technology manufacturers, 
technology innovators, transportation 
companies, banks, insurers, brokers, freight 
forwarders, ports, and so forth. Each and every 
company on this global supply chain has a role 
in preventing the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, in some cases, even more 
important than governments themselves have 
in preventing proliferation. 
In short, these and other grand global 
challenges of our time, from public health to 
conventional arms trafficking, nuclear 
proliferation to climate change, and so forth, 
including transnational crime and 
environmental degradation are so big and 
complex that it has been noted multiple times 
over the course of the day. Governments alone 
cannot manage their negative consequences. 
Whether we live and work in a civil society or 
in a private industry we all have been recruited 
as actors on the global stage. 
People of Hiroshima have long 
understood it. There is much I think that we 
can learn from the activism of this city. I have 
dedicated much of my own career to combating 
the spread of nuclear weapons specifically. And 
it was originally inspired by, as a young child, 
in fact, by survivors of the Hiroshima attack 
itself. I did initially inside my own government, 
the government of Canada, ultimately 
continued that in private industry. And now I 
continue that work in civil society, as a think 
tank. 
Every sector of society can play a role 
in managing these global issues whether it is 
proliferation or environmental deviation or 
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international public health. As I mentioned at 
the outset, throughout the course of our human 
history we have all lamented our inability to 
influence the course of human destiny, whether 
it is preventing war again or climate change. 
We and our ancestors before us have struggled 
against seeming futility of meaningful impact 
on the world around us. That world has 
changed fundamentally. The actions of a single 
philanthropist saves a country from the 
scourge of Ebola, the self-immolation of one 
man in Tunisia sets off the Arab Spring, and 
the brave actions of a single young girl in 
Pakistan helps to undercut a movement to 
repress the rights of girls around the world. 
I would suggest this morning that 
meeting this afternoon and meeting the grand 
global challenges of our time requires not just 
official responses any longer, but responses 
that cut across us government, industry, and 
civil society. Today, we are all international 
actors as individuals at our schools, at places of 
work in private industry, as companies, as a 
member of churches or mosques, and 
lamenting the failure of institutions is no 
longer an acceptable approach to managing 
these grand challenges. Each of us in this room 
has not only the ability and the responsibility 
but the moral drive to contribute to a much 
more meaning to these grand global challenges. 
Thank you very much. 
 
  












































































































































1995 年に発表した『An Evolving US Nuclear 
Posture』という有名な報告書があります。この
中で段階的な核兵器の廃絶を提言していますが、











ベラ委員会は 1996 年に報告書『Report of the 
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons』を発表し、核兵器の廃絶を提

























という趣旨の記述が 2 カ所あります。 
もう一つ、2009 年に発表された核不拡散・核
軍 縮 の た め の 国 際 委 員 会 （ ICNND ：
International Commission on Nuclear Non-
proliferation and Disarmament ）の報告書
『 Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical 
Agenda for Global Policymakers』の中には、広























































































れて、当初 16 カ国だった共同声明が 2014 年 10
月には 155 カ国まで増えております。日本政府








2013 年 10 月から日本政府は共同声明に加わる
と同時に、核の傘の下にいるグループ十数カ国を
動かし、核兵器禁止条約を積極的に支持しない、









































































②「アジア太平洋や北東アジアの非核地帯    
化に努力せよ」 




































再び核兵器を使用するな  △ 
核兵器を廃絶せよ  × 
核実験を禁止せよ  △ 
核兵器を禁止せよ  × 
核抑止戦略を改めよ  × 
被爆体験に耳を傾けよ  △ 


















































































しかし、北朝鮮が 2006 年に第 1 回核実験を行
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ところが奇妙なことに、私どもは 2011 年 5 月
12 日に報告書を安保理事会に提出しまして、本
来なら、中国が公表を拒否しておりましたから明




なりました。スマホで「The Weekly Standard, 
North Korea」と入力すれば、われわれの提出し
















































Strategic and International Studies）の上級研
究員である、エドワード・ルトワック（Edward 










































School of Economics and Political Science）のメ






























ら 2011 年にかけて見聞しました。これが 2014
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＜表 1 平和宣言（2013 年まで）における出現頻度上位 54 単語＞ 
＊1「人びと」を含む。  ＊2「国際連合」を含む。 ＊3「あらた」を含む。

















1 世界 378  28 体験 53 
2 核兵器 326  29 国家 53 
3 平和 271  30 市長 52 
4 核 228  31 国連*2 52 
5 人類 212  32 禁止 49 
6 広島 182  33 地球 48 
7 戦争 156  34 努力 47 
8 廃絶 154  35 条約 47 
9 ヒロシマ 126  36 日本 47 
10 原爆 124  37 開催 45 
11 被爆者 122  38 新た*3 45 
12 市民 106  39 道 44 
13 被爆 104  40 心 41 
14 都市 90  41 誓う 40 
15 国際 79  42 決意 40 
16 軍縮 78  43 連帯 40 
17 訴える 76  44 思い 40 
18 人々*1 75  45 保有国 39 
19 実現 62  46 御霊 39 
20 会議 60  47 深い 38 
21 強い 57  48 援護 37 
22 犠牲者 57  49 確立 37 
23 政府 57  50 声 36 
24 求める 55  51 未来 36 
25 迎える 55  52 生存 35 
26 実験 55  53 破壊 35 
27 人間 54  54 恒久 35 























































＜図 3 クラスタリング分析による平和宣言＞ 



































































 ＜表 2＞は朝日新聞「被爆 60年アンケート」
の自由記述式回答（体験記・メッセージ）の中
で出現頻度の高い上位 50 単語を示したもの
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1 被爆 5060  26 体験 1017 
2 原爆 4584  27 目 1014 
3 人 4397  28 人々 971 
4 戦争 3248  29 核 970 
5 広島 2927  29 姿 970 
6 見る 2570  31 病院 939 
7 母 2038  32 学校 921 
8 亡くなる 1851  33 現在 911 
9 平和 1808  34 8 月 887 
10 忘れる 1794  35 思い 858 
11 水 1694  36 人達 853 
12 家 1644  37 市内 850 
13 父 1536  38 絶対 812 
14 死ぬ 1504  39 焼ける 807 
15 子供 1503  40 声 783 
16 当時 1407  41 方々 782 
17 生きる 1318  42 昭和 777 
18 長崎 1278  43 姉 767 
19 自分 1276  44 手 755 
20 世界 1188  45 顔 745 
21 日本 1101  46 火傷 740 
22 投下 1078  47 多く 736 
23 核兵器 1063  48 体 718 
24 死体 1056  49 人間 716 
25 思い出す 1028  50 頭 712 
 






























































































































































































量解析を通して－、『長崎医学会雑誌』、85 巻特集号、208-213、2010 年 
松浦陽子、佐藤健一、川野徳幸、広島の平和観－平和宣言を通して－、『広島平和科学』35、67-101、
2013 年 
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アフリカ連合（African Union）  
アフリカ 54 ヵ国・地域が加盟する地域機関。2002 年 7 月、「アフリカ統一機構」（OAU）












核不拡散条約（Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons：NPT）  





（第 4 条１）と規定している。  
 
カットオフ条約（兵器用核分裂性物質生産禁止条約）  
（Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty：FMCT）  
核兵器の原材料になる高濃縮ウラン（U235）、プルトニウム（Pu239）等の核分裂性物質の生産
を禁止することで、核兵器の数量を増やさないことを目的とする条約構想。  




1976 年秋広島市と長崎市がまとめた国連事務総長への報告では、被爆による 1945 年末まで





胞突然変異、胎内被爆者の知的障害（原爆小頭症）などがよく知られている。2014 年 3 月末
での原爆被爆者の総数は、192,719 人。  
国際刑事裁判所（The International Criminal Court：ICC）  




う能力や意思がない等の場合、ICC の管轄権が認められる（補完性の原則）。  






コペンハーゲン合意（Copenhagen Accord）  




に削減すべき目標、途上国は削減のための行動をそれぞれ決めて 2010 年 1 月末までに提出す
ること、先進国及び途上国のそれぞれの行動について測定・報告・検証 (MRV)にされること
などが盛り込まれた。日本は 2013 年、同合意に基づき、2020 年の温室効果ガス削減目標を
2005 年比 3.8％とすることを発表した。  
 




















ドーハ・ラウンド（Doha Round）  




































る。日本は本年 2014 年 5 月に批准、同条約の発効は 12 月 24 日となる。  
 
包括的核実験禁止条約：（Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty：CTBT:）  
1963 年に成立した部分的核実験禁止条約（PTBT：大気圏内、宇宙空間および水中に  おける
核兵器実験を禁止する条約）で禁止されなかった地下核実験を含む、あらゆる空間における























達成期限である 2015 年より先の国際開発目標（*「ポスト 2015 年開発アジェンダ」）につい
ても、策定に向けた国際社会での議論が行われている。  
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